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Introduction
Societal bias based on birth is well-
known in Indian society. Caste-based 
marginalisation has been a historical 
“crime” in Indian society. Caste, on the 
other hand, is not exclusive to Indian 





Man is a social animal having a great sense of social inclusivity. Religion influences our 
perceptions of social exclusion and inclusion around the world. Due to the global expansion of 
religion’s influence on people’s lives, the global resurgence of newly imposed standards, laws, 
and restrictions has occurred. Demographically, and particularly in terms of its impact on 
societal conditioning, it has been a significant factor. Many people consider religion a critical 
component of who they are, what they believe, the community in which they live, and the overall 
purpose in their lives. Another way to say this is that as a result of its cultural foundations, 
the same religion has also given rise to other types of marginalisation in other cultures and 
nations. Everywhere you look, marginalised groups are under discussion because of their social, 
ethnic, economic, and cultural obstacles. Marginality must be dealt with globally, regardless 
of form. Religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other minority groups tend to be more marginalised 
in many countries. There are also counter-cultures in mainstream cultures and religions. They 
are generally people from disadvantaged backgrounds, minorities. They are suffering from 
poverty, social isolation, and political disenfranchisement. Their marginalisation can vary on 
a continuum ranging from less to more intense. Societies are typically split into two classes: 
one class is very powerful, and the other class is destitute. This study explores the connection 
between religion, culture, and the phenomenon of marginalisation.
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culture; it can be found throughout 
South	Asia.	In	today’s	Muslim	nations,	
such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
untouchability, caste identity, and caste-
based societal discrimination have all 




nation-states, even though constitutional 
legislation outlaws it. Certain aspects 
of caste identity, such as caste-based 
social marginalisation and the practice 
of untouchability, are still practised in 
today’s	Muslim-dominated	communities	
in Pakistan and Bangladesh.[1] Hindu 
holy writings, as well as traditional 
Hindu texts and laws, have set standards 
and ethics for life, culture, religion, and 
belief. As a result, societal inequalities 
such as untouchability have become 
canonical. The four varna system of 
Hinduism divides people into four 
groups based on their birth varna: 
Brahmanas (priests), Kshatriyas 
(warriors), Vaisyas (traders), and 
Shudras (slaves) (laborers).
Varna is a common translation for 
“caste,” while there is a more accurate 
Indian term for “caste,” jati, which is 
also used. There are hundreds of jatis 
that designate group identity about the 
purity of food consumption (shared 
table) and endogamous marriage, 
according	to	Max	Weber’s	laws	of	
commensality and connubium. Colonial 
interference, particularly the rigorous 
ascription of certain jobs to certain 
castes and the results of colonial 
census dynamics centred on social 
stratification,	have	been	related	to	the	
contemporary and exceptionally severe 
forms of caste behaviour. Although pre-
colonial culture appeared to be more 
adaptable, caste-based social exclusion 
had existed for as long as history 
records, and economic marginalisation 
was inextricably linked to it.[1]
People throughout the world are 
talking	about	marginalized	groups’	
issues, including their social, ethnic, 
economic, and cultural concerns. 
Marginality, in all of its forms, is a 
serious global problem that must be 
addressed. Religious, ethnic, linguistic, 
and other minorities are frequently 
marginalised in many countries. Within 
mainstream cultures or religions, there 
are subcultures. They are frequently 
underprivileged members of minority 
groups. They are impoverished 
economically, socially, and politically, 
and they are isolated from the majority. 
Their marginalisation might vary in 
terms of breadth, scope, and intensity. 
On opposite ends of the spectrum, most 
countries and cultures have powerful 
and impoverished people, with varying 
degrees of power and poverty in the 
between. People with more authority 
have more independence, social status, 
and life security. Fear, uncertainty, and 
unfairness have no place in the lives 
of	the	poor.	The	degree	of	poverty—
economic,	social,	or	cultural—
determines the form and nature of 
marginality.[10]
 Caste, creed, religion, or race-
based marginalisation is a disability 
or	affliction.	The	Dalit Movement can 
be	defined	as	a	group	of	Dalits who 
are protesting societal exploitation 
based on class, caste, creed, culture, 
and social issues. The prejudice 
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practised	by	Hindu	society’s	age-old	
caste hierarchical system is to blame 
for this exploitation. For millennia, 
this hierarchy has been the source of 
oppression of Dalits in all sectors of 
society. As a result, the Dalits have 
suffered from poverty and humiliation. 
The Dalit	movement	is	a	fight	to	end	the	
upper	castes’	socio-cultural	hegemony.	
It is a grassroots movement that seeks 
justice through speeches, literary 
works, dramas, songs, cultural groups, 
and other forms of expression. As a 
result, it may be considered a Dalit-led 
movement in Hindu society, aiming for 
equality with all other castes.[4] Many 
negative narratives have arisen as a 
result of this marginalisation based on 
culture	or	religion.	‘Identity	Politics’	
is one of the most essential themes. 
“Political arguments that focus on the 
interests and opinions of groups with 
whom people identify” is how identity 
politics	is	defined.	Race,	class,	religion,	
gender, ethnicity, ideology, nation, 
sexual orientation, culture, information 
preferences, history, musical or literary 
choices, medical issues, vocations, 
or hobbies can all have an impact on 
people’s	politics.	Not	all	members	of	a	
group engage in identity politics.[5]
Several communities have 
expressed concern about asserting 
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and 
cultural identity and autonomy. Only 
majoritarian groups gain from the 
modernisation process as a result of the 
majoritarian system of administration, 
and they make up the bulk of the 
socio-political fabric. Minority groups 
are still marginalised, underprivileged, 
and on the outskirts of society. This is 
where the identity politics phenomenon 
began. The purpose of this study is 
to contextualise academic critical 
readings	on	identity	politics	in	today’s	
Globalized Asian culture. Though 
this	is	not	an	attempt	to	fill	the	void	
by chronicling the modalities of 
articulation of identity politics in South 
Asia, which is a large and complicated 
subject, it is an attempt to provide 
some insight into why identity politics 
became a dominant force in the region 
in	the	twenty-first	century.
The Purpose
In the second part of the twentieth 
century, the phrase “identity politics” 
and movements associated with 
it were coined. Class movements, 
feminist movements, gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual movements, disability 
movements, ethnic movements, and 
post-colonial movements are only a few 
examples. Over the last two centuries, 
multidisciplinary studies have looked 
into the impact of identity politics 
and the many movements that have 
formed under its banner in South Asia. 
“In the modern world, two competing 
viewpoints of worth have often been 
at odds: one emerging from culturally 
learned ideas of groups as better or 
worse, and the other arising from the 
collapse of social hierarchies and the 
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advent of equality,” writes Professor 
Ashutosh Varshney.[6] The latter 
continuously strives to undermine 
the former by attacking the inherited 
structure or rhetoric of group authority. 
Identity politics, or what we may call 
the desire for recognition, is thus a 
politics of equal dignity and resistance 
at its foundation (or authenticity). It has 
roots in gender politics, sexual politics, 
ethnic politics, religious interpretations, 
or some combination of these in both 
the developing and developed worlds.”
There	are	numerous	classifications	
available. There are several shades 
of	identity	politics,	each	defined	by	
differing levels of societal sensitivity 
and sensibility. They can be divided into 
two categories:
Power dynamics and politics of 1. 
dominance
Oppositional politics is a phrase that 2. 
refers to how individuals act when 
they disagree with one another.
Dominance politics is the pursuit 
of power through the use of identity 
as a mobilisation tool. Internal unity is 
attained	by	the	use	of	identification	as	
a unifying force in resistance politics, 
which is a kind of rights politics. 
The	majority	religion’s	identity	
politics belong to the former, whereas 
minorities’	identity	politics,	such	as	
Dalits and Adivasis, belong to the 
latter. Several times in the previous two 
centuries, religious identity has been 
at the forefront of political movements 
in South Asian countries. Internal 
contradictions, on the other hand, drove 
almost all of them: religion acted as a 
potent mobilisation tool as well as a 
source of political ambiguity. However, 
the most serious issue in this theory is 
that it constantly marginalises minority 
power.	A	sort	of	social	influence	in	
which	a	majority	is	influenced	by	the	
thoughts or behaviours of a small 
group of people is known as minority 
influence.	Unlike	other	methods	of	
persuasion, this usually involves a 
change	in	one’s	perspective.	The	term	
“conversion” is used to describe a 
mental transition.
Dominance politics and religious 
fervour: The religious nature of the 
inhabitants of South Asia has been a 
commonly held idea about the region 
from the reports of mediaeval European 
travellers.	Nothing	of	the	people’s	
religious practises stood out enough to 
merit such a designation. The public 
execution	of	rites	and	followers’	annual	
visits to a network of pilgrimage sites 
may have impacted this idea. The 
most conspicuous of the few similar 
qualities	shared	by	today’s	South	
Asian states were their multicultural 
and multi-religious aspects. They 
established certain criteria for inter-
regional linkages, guided the growth of 
social ties, set the outlines of cultural 
life, and, most importantly, shaped the 
demographic pattern. Government-to-
government relations were characterized 
more by past recriminations than by 
prospects, resulting in mutual suspicion, 
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distrust, hostility, and even military 
conflict.
‘India’	is	present	in	communal	
discourse in Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
and	‘Pakistan	and	Bangladesh’	are	
present in India. The Sinhala-Tamil 
war	has	a	significant	impact	on	Tamil	
politics in India. As a result, ethnic 
and religious groupings in numerous 
countries played an essential role in 
the establishment and expression of 
identity politics. However, identity 
politics have collided with national 
and secular politics in each of them. 
It	can	be	traced	back	to	India’s	anti-
colonial national movement when caste 
and religious identities played a key 
role. There are numerous examples of 
religious	identity’s	influence	on	political	
mobilisation in South Asian civilization. 
The establishment of Pakistan and the 
erection of a Ram mandir in Ayodhya 
are two such examples. The projection 
of the “outsider” as the “enemy” and the 
Hindu cultural pre-eminence in the past 
were the most important factors in the 
formation of Hindu identity politics in 
the post-Partition era.
It’s	especially	intriguing	to	
compare the state to a “salad bowl” 
and a “melting pot.” Salad bowl 
ideology, sometimes known as “secular 
nationalism,” is a term used to describe 
secular politics and its need for 
legitimacy in areas where religion and 
politics intersect. In such a polity, all 
religions would be kept at the “same 
distance.” Hindu nationalism, which 
has	been	a	significant	movement	since	
1989, has posed the greatest threat to 
this position. The concept of a “melting 
pot” is central to the Hindu nationalist 
vision of the nation. According to 
this narrative, other religions must 
assimilate into the Hindu centre. 
According to this storey, Hinduism is 
the	source	of	India’s	distinct	national	
character. India was once a Hindu 
country, according to tradition.
Resistance Politics and 
Marginalized Groups: “The process of 
subject choice of identities is more or 
less voluntary,” Sarah Joseph writes 
in Interrogating Culture: Critical 
Perspectives on Contemporary Social 
Theory. “Inequality of power and 
privilege in society also plays a role 
in the process.” Differences in the 
strength of inequality across groups 
also	influence	the	process	of	identity	
formation.”[2] The identity politics of 
marginalised and oppressed peoples rely 
heavily on opposition and resistance. 
Their	marginalisation	defines	their	
identity, and the politics that result 
in stress inclusion and equality. This 
type of identity politics is distinct from 
religious identity politics in Hinduism. 
Resistance characterises the former, 
whilst the latter seeks hegemony over 
marginalised communities.
What Does It Mean to Be a Dalit?	
Dalit Identity Politics: 
The caste system, which is based 
on	Manu	Smriti’s	four	varna system, is 
regarded to be the essential identity of 
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which emphasised the necessity of an 
autonomous “Dalit” identity, immensely 
benefited	the	Dalit	movement’s	self-
articulation.[9] They were helped and 
shielded by their ‘Dalit’	identity	from	
Dalits	who	flocked	to	the	capitalist	
Congress as Harijans or communists as 
a	proletariat.’
This process has been methodically 
cultivated in the Indian mentality 
throughout history. The non-Brahmin 
movement led by Jyotiba Phule in 
Maharashtra, and later the Dravidian 
movement led by Periyar in Tamil 
Nadu,	exemplified	this	ethnicization	
process. The movement was fueled 
by new ideas spread in schools 
by European missionaries, which 
eventually culminated in the belief 
in an “Aryan race.” William Jones 
remembered the idea of a single, 
founding race whose branches had 
extended to Europe and India in 1792, 
based on a study of the Indo-European 
linguistic family. German Indologists 
such as Albert Weber, R. Roth, A. Kuhn, 
and J. Mohl expanded on this concept 
in the mid-nineteenth century, coining 
the terms “Sanskritic race” and “Vedic 
people.” When these beliefs arrived 
in India, Hindu revivalists like Tilak 
and Dayanand Saraswati immediately 
adopted them, convincing Hindus that 
they were the superior people who had 
dominated the world.
On the other hand, Mahatma 
Jyotiba Phule used the same strategies 
to attain the opposite goal. He 
persons in the Indian subcontinent. It 
establishes	the	identification	of	a	person	
at the time of birth. According to Manu 
Smriti, it is founded on a hierarchical 
concept of upper and lower castes, with 
a matching connection based on rights 
and obligations. As a result, varna, or 
caste, is a continuum that spans the 
highest Brahmin sub-caste down to the 
lowest	untouchable	caste.	The	system’s	
worst aspect is that it is impossible to 
determine	its	specific	identity.	Castes	
are hazy because of their large numbers 
and dynamism. Contrary to popular 
belief, caste is not a static group that has 
evolved as a result of splits and mergers, 
resulting in new castes with higher ritual 
prestige in their particular regions based 
on their material strength. Similarly, 
people’s	various	subsistence	strategies	
are determined by their location, 
resulting in social rank differences 
among castes.[8] As a result, caste 
creates	a	fluid	life	world	in	the	Indian	
subcontinent. The concept that only 
individuals who have been subjected 
to a particular form of oppression 
can	define	or	resist	it	is	at	the	basis	of	
“identity politics.” Men are incapable of 
combating gender discrimination, and 
anti-racist actions can only be carried 
out by those who have been victims of 
racism. When Dr. Ambedkar publicly 
condemned	V.R.	Shinde’s	Depressed	
Classes Mission at a Depressed Classes 
Conference in Nagpur in May 1920, the 
concept of identity became prominent 
in the context of caste. This declaration, 
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were denied access to basic services 
such as village wells, public roadways, 
and school admission for their children. 
They were compelled to dwell in 
various communities in various zones. 
Because	they	didn’t	have	access	to	
temples,	they	couldn’t	execute	burial	
or birth ceremonies without the help of 
Brahmin priests.
Caste mobilisation employed two 
fundamental strategies for political 
purposes: one, to unify various castes 
under a single identity and stake a claim 
to a greater piece of the pie, and two, 
to prevent their share from being stolen 
by others. The upper castes used the 
first	strategy,	whereas	Dr.	Babasaheb	
Ambedkar’s	Dalit campaign used the 
second.
Political Catalysts and Cross-
Border/Asian Scenarios
Various identity-based political 
parties try to foster cultural revolution 
to varying degrees. They are divided 
into two groups: those who use 
cultural banners to form broad social 
coalitions and acquire access to money 
and power, and those who prioritise 
cultural change over support, resources, 
and power to promote the norms they 
value. To increase the number of 
people who might identify with such 
a cultural vision, instrumental identity 
movements usually leave their group 
culture creations open-ended. Political 
strategies are interwoven with political 
forces’	creation	of	group	cultures.	
developed the Bahujan (shudra-
atishudra) ethnic identity, denouncing 
Brahmins as intruders who subjugated 
the natives and giving the lower castes 
a reason to resist. Non-Brahmin castes 
were invited to unite against Brahmin 
dominance	for	the	first	time,	based	on	a	
common	ethnic	origin	–	that	of	India’s	
early inhabitants. Despite the existence 
of	Kshatriya	symbolism	in	Phule’s	
Satyashodhak idiom, the movement 
avoided Sanskritization because it 
detested upper-caste culture and refused 
to accept upper-caste role models as 
role models.
As expressed by Pandit Ayothee 
Thass, [3] a similar pattern emerged 
in the South with the Dravidian 
movement, which engineered caste 
union by endowing the lower castes 
with ethnic identity, not only as original 
residents but also as Buddhists. By 
renaming	prior	caste-specific	sabhas	
(organisations) Adi-Dravida Mahajan 
Sabha and Adi-Andhra Mahajan Sabha, 
it encouraged the “adi” (original) 
movement in the Madras region.
The most dramatic manifestations 
of identity politics have come from 
members of the lowest castes, who have 
long	been	ostracised	from	society’s	
mainstream. Dalit consciousness may 
be traced back to the Renaissance, 
except for Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, 
and Kerala, even if the Renaissance was 
primarily focused on concerns affecting 
the upper castes. Both physically and 
spiritually, Dalits were avoided. They 
45
Preeti Oza
Popular ideas of Sri Lankan Tamil 
identity, for example, emphasised 
the lengthy tradition of Tamil literary 
production until the 1970s. This sense 
of Tamil identity was linked to the 
group’s	extensive	involvement	in	
western education and bureaucracy, 
as well as their increased political 
support for constitutional reforms 
such as federalism and more formal 
acknowledgement of Tamil. The Tamil 
Congress	and	the	Federal	Party,	the	first	
post-colonial Sri Lankan Tamil parties, 
had minimal success in accomplishing 
their goals. This includes Pakistani 
nationalism, Bangladeshi nationalism, 
Hindu nationalism, Kashmiri 
nationalism, and Bodo nationalism.
The countries of South Asia are a 
one-of-a-kind example of sociocultural 
diversity and discrimination, resulting 
in	complex	conflicts.	Except	for	the	
Maldives, every country in South Asia 
has multiracial, multiethnic, multi-
caste, multilingual, multireligious, and 
multi-religious populations. Minorities 
and majorities exist in terms of cultural 
affiliation.	Sub-nationalist	aspirations	
have been created by minority cultural 
groups	posing	a	threat	to	the	region’s	





efforts. The leaders wanted to create a 
nation that was “Pakistan-Islam-Urdu” 
based.	The	constituent	tribes’	more	
organic and integral ethno-regional 
relationships and identities, on the 
other hand, proved too fragile to be 
sustained on this base. The formation 
of a new state from then-East Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and the accompanying rise 
of ethnic nationalism among Sindhis, 
Pashtoons, and Balochis was a major 
shock to religious identity.
The disintegration of the Yugoslav 
federation,	civil	conflict	and	atrocities	
in Rwanda and Sudan, the growth of the 
European Union, and the rise of Islamic 
extremism all highlight the importance 
of	identity	politics	in	today’s	world.	
National identities and perspectives on 
national	interests	have	been	influenced	
by changes in political institutions, 
as well as internal and international 
events. Changes like these have thawed 
long-frozen Cold War tensions between 
China and Taiwan, as well as between 
the Koreas, making management much 
more	difficult.	National	identities	
and identity crises in East Asia are 




oceans, connecting Asia and the rest of 
the world. It has also been a source of 
concern	due	to	conflict.	In	recent	years,	
territorial disputes have gotten worse, 
culminating in violent clashes between 
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
Conclusion
Despite its importance and 
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Despite the lack of a direct link 
between globalisation and language 
or caste politics, it has had the most 
influence	on	how	religion	has	been	
employed as a source of group identity 
in Indian policies, particularly in its 
Hindu nationalist version. Tribal politics 
has an impact on Hindu nationalist 




two basic premises. While globalisation 
has	influenced	India’s	identity	politics,	
they are mostly internal, and it is 
India’s	popular	politics’	domination	
over identity issues that have allowed 
the country to integrate with the global 
economy.[]
popularity, the Identity Politics School 
of Thought is never taken lightly. 
Globalisation and macro/micro identity 
politics have been the subject of a 
variety of critical analyses. A few 
examples are as follows:
What effect has globalisation had on 1. 
religion	and	caste	politics?
Has	India’s	rising	integration	2. 
into the global system, as well 
as the cross-border movement of 
capital, labor, products, services, 
technology, and ideas, altered how 
India’s	language	and	religious	
groups, castes, and tribes have 
structured their politics and made 
policy	claims?
Has the inter- or intra-Diaspora had 3. 
a substantial impact on the Indian 
subcontinent’s	identity	politics?
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